T HE PATIENT with coronary disease comes into court, or his descendents for him, mainly under 3 major conditions: (1) it is claimed that he has received a personal injury which caused or aggravated his heart disease; (2) his cardiac mischief has been produced or worsened by his employment (Workmen's Compensation); or (3) he is entitled to premature pension payments, governimental or private, by virtue of an occupational hazard to his heart.
In a case carried to the Supreme Court of Minnesota which was, however, not a cardiac problem, the Court said "Since we as judges lay no claim to expertness in these matters [the etiology of cancer], we can add nothing to the discussion, nor can we be expected to resolve these conflicts which the medical profession itself has been unable to resolve. Notwithstanding this uneertainty, we think we are bound to treat the opinions of these doctors as something more than speculation and conjecture, which are but polite terms for unscientific guesswork. " 1 And as Larson says " Plainly, the heart cases will continue to be troublesome as long as some reach the appellate courts on a record in which the medical testimony is emphatically certain that effort and exertion have nothing whatever to do with coronary thrombosis, while most such cases are based on the opposite thought."2 Thus, the reason for litigation, in the cases of coronary disease, is referred to differenees in opinion within the medical profession. The skepticism of lawyers about medical disagreemeints is illustrated by Lambert' s belief that it is best to have adversaries in court rather *The Peter T. Bohan Lecture, delivered at the Alumni Day meeting of the University of Kansas Medical Alumni Association, Kansas City, Kansas, June 4, 1960. Circulation, Volume XXII, October 1960 than panels and " impartial " physicians, in these cases, since "the expert ism of today becomes the wasm of tomorrow. " So litigation will go on, for, according to Justice Holmes "our ideal may be repose, but our destiny is effort. "3 It should be remembered that Holmes lived to the age of 94 .
There are influenees, foreign to medical thinking, which color the legal aspects of the coronary problem, but which, none the less, physicians should understand. The first of these is the difference between the lawyer's and the doctor's definition of causation. This has been well discussed by Small. 4 The physician, indeed, must undergo an almost mystical revelation to accommodate his thinking to that of the legal profession as it relates to causation. " But," as Small says, " the lawyer and the doctor have so pontificated over simple words, so preened them and institutionalized them, that the layman thus put in the dark, is as wise as the lawyer and the doctor when each is confronted with the other 's busywork." "The lawyer simply is not after the same cause as the doctor, and therefore cannot be expected to reach the same causal ends." This is perhaps even more striking in the case of Workmen's Compensation than in personal injury actions, because of what Horovitz rightly calls "the litigious phrase: 'arising out of' employment. "5 The lawyer complains that the doctor has "difficulty in separating cause from etiology" whereas "lawyer-cause, whatever modifier be used, can have no meaning except that which it takes from the system, the system represented by the concept-term, Law. As that system is one of adjustment toward social harmony, certain policy considerations will inescapably control the adjustment process-policy considerations springing from social demands.' '4 627 Thus, "the defendant's part in the misfortune need not have been its sole cause, or even its principal cause, but only a cause of sufficient proportion, in the light of his conduct, to make it seem just for him to shoulder the cost. "
It is in this phrase "policy considerations springing from social demands " that one sees the other chief influence affecting litigation of coronary heart disease. The Even among lawyers there seems to be a difference of opinion about the genesis of these statutes-one side believing them to be the outgrowth of older common laws concerning personal injury, but the most vocal advocates asserting that Workmen 's Compensation has nothing to do with ''tort law,'" " scope of employment," "proximate causation," " foreseeability, " " assumption of risk," or " blameworthiness "-all factors in personal injury actions. As Riesenfeld says, it " is fundamentally a braneh of social insurance, designed to protect a segment of the population against sub-standard living conditions brought about by a typical hazard of modern society. "6 Perhaps The development of Workmen 's Compensation differs in various countries. The British law originally defined the purpose in much the same way as do most of our present State statutes, namely, recompense for personal injury "by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. " But it has become an "'enterprise liability." "'The enterprise of employment is responsible for harms occasioned by it. " It is an entirely new social principle of "liability without fault." Or as Lloyd George is credited with expressing it, " The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workingman. " 6 Larson,2' as United States Undersecretary of Labor, states the underlying philosophy as it applies in this country, at least in the vision of the welfare state, " Workmen's Compensation is one segment or department of the overall pattern of income-insurance, which includes unemployment insurance, sickness and disability insurance, and old age and survivors insurance." This concept is obvious in England, Australia, and New Zealand. The American system is unique in that it "is neither a branch of tort law nor social insurance of the British or Continental type," but Circulation, Volume XXII, October 1960 has some of the characteristics of each. It is "social in philosophy" but "largely private in structure."
It will be seen that nonoccupational disability is the only interruption of employment nlot yet generally covered by insurance in this country, and in this fact lies the growing modification of Workmen 's Compensation rulings toward making it a type of over-all coverage for disability of any sort, and through this painful, Procrustean process chronic degenerative diseases, such as coronary artery disease, enter the field. The defense of the admission of these diseases as industrial accidents is that the people demand it; but this erosion of the concept of "industrial accident" has placed the medical profession in an untenable position.
How has this come about? By the process through which all law develops. As Roscoe 
No one would deny the influence of anl acute emotional, stress in precipitating an attack of angina, but the assumption of stress as the cause of atherosclerosis or hypertension is scientifically unwarranted and socially dangerous in its implications. Furthermore, coronary thrombosis to be attributed to an emotional episode must, it seemns to me, show its onset by symptoms appearing at the time of the stimulus or in relation to some measurable alteration in heart rate, blood pressure, or other significant vital index, which continues unabated after the episode. No one has shown convincingly that local alterations in the coronary vessels (such as subintimal hemorrhage or rupture of atheromatous abscess), or hypercoagulability of the blood in these vessels, are related to either physical or mental stress.
In There is one other compensation area into which coronary disease has entered by frontal attack. This is the disability pensioni system through the passage of so-called "heart laws," Lay bugaboos become enshrined and used as precedent, as in a Tennessee case, " The Court takes judicial notice that climbing of stairs is condemned by the medical profession as among the activities most harmful and dangerous to persons afflicted with heart trouble and arteriosclerosis. " This is similar to the superstition about the danger to cardiac patients of raising the arms over the head.
Is this uneasy medicolegal situation likely to continue? Can any principles be promulgated concerning the relationship between overt coronary disease and the environmental influences subject to litigation?
It seems to me that the American system favors adversary action in the courts for an indefinite time. Certainly this is true in personal injury cases, since they must remain so highly individualized.
The American Heart Association has a Committee on Strain and Trauma which, for several years, has been investigating the medical and the legal aspects of the whole prob-lem. As a miiember, I knlow the diffieulties it faces, and the uneertainties of defining scientific proof. The precipitation of an attack of angina, fatal or not, caan reasonably be shownl at the time of an unusual event, but the relationship of such an event to the clinieal pattern of coronlary occlusion and myocardial infaretion is much nmore obscure.
Blumgart10 has stated the situationi clearly: "'Recognition of the causal relationship of effort to acute myocardial inifaretion should not lead the medical officer or physician to ascribe every attack of acute inyocardial infaret to preceding effort. The occurrence of acute myocardial infaretion in the foregoing cases during or immediately after strenuous effort clearly establishes a causal relationship. As with most diagnostic problems in medicine, the relationi of effort to anl attack of acute myocardial infaretion in a particular patient may be certain, may be probable, suggestive or improbable or may be considered to be nonexistent.
"The relation is considered definite if the following criteria are satisfied:
1. The developmnenit and incerease of cardiac symptoms such as pain or substerinal distress during or iimmediately following uniusual effort. 2 . Continuation of syimiptoms after eessation of effort.
3. The presen-ice of the clinical signls and symptomus of acute mnyocardial infaretion.
4. Developmnent of the characteristic eleetrocardiographic pattern of acute anterior, posterior or lateral wall infaretion. " Regan and Mloritz"lhave also delimuited the influence of trauma and stress on heart disease. In the Editorial Comnment accompanying a reprint of this article in the book of Moritz and Helberg, the opinion is giveen that "If a medical witness is to be justified in attributinig the disability for wvlhielh eompensationi is (claine(l to sonme specific episode of tr aumiia, lbe should have valid reasons for believing that the sanme degree or kind of disability would not have developed at the time that it did were it not for the specified trauniatic event. This mneans that the witness should be able to defend the propositioln that the particular maniifestationi of the disease for which compeensatioin is claimed was not consistent with spontaneous occurrenee and was, therefore, caused or contributed to by the effects of the trauma."
The much bolder coneept that occupations as such, especially the so-called emotionally stressful ones, are responsible for coronarv artery atherosclerosis and disease is entirely lacking in proof. Regan and Moritz state "In no circunistances can stress or injury be held accountable for coronary atherosclerosis." A great cult of stress is being developed in this eountry, aided by reports that, under conditions of emotionial pressure, serumn cholesterol rises and coronary troubles ensue. Gofman12 has recently shown, however, that in one of these studies the rise in serum cholesterol was comnpletelv explicable on the basis of the admiitted fact that the vietimls (accountants) under stress ate miore.
WX\hether or not we are ready to admit overeating and phvsical inactivity to the category of industrial hazards is questionable, vet this would seem to be true, for political purposes, in the passage of "'heart laws.'' However, there wolould appear, in fact, to be inoie evidence that the energetic stressful. reactive life has protective value, but sinee it is impossible to titrate emotional stress the conclusions of "stress" studies are largely meaningless.
In granted to the employee he should also be allowed to return to his old common-law privilege of suing the employer in addition, if the latter has been negligent. I have seen no such solicitude for the employer when the worker is negligent.
The position of the physician in this whole picture is truly anomalous. He is still necessary for the process of the law but his testimony is accepted or rejected often quite cavalierly by the courts, and in relation to the social philosophy of the geographic area.
Of course the doctor who has treated the plaintiff is in a difficult situation and may be subject to the dichotomy of loyalty to his patient vis-a-vis his scieiitific conscience. There maay be the desire to be a "good fel- This is at least highly competent medical opinion, but the difference in probative weight between medical judgment and judicial deciSiOl is illuminated by a Kansas ease where it was held that compensation should be granted to the plaintiff since, "if his physical structure gives way under the stress of his usual labor, his death is an accident."
To the physician it appears more reasonable to allot a certain percentage of disability to an occupational aggravation of a chronic disease. This is the practice in California, Kentucky, and North Dakota. Above all, insistence upon an autopsy in death cases is, I believe, imperative.
Finally, the doctor is at a disadvantage in that he must maintain a scientific attitudehis greatest strength lies in this-but in Smith's phrase " the anivil of the law has always resounmded to the striking iron of science " amid "few iiembers of the populace caii have failed to hear the reverberatinlg blows or to see the cascading sparks which fly from these impacts." He thinks that the lawyer, the doctor, and the man of science " may find themselves companion toilers on a more intricate pattern called 'social synthesis.' ''9 What I wish to emphasize by this quotation is that the physician should have as n-uch right as the lawyer to think in terms of this " social synthesis" within the rigorous conifinement of scientific observation. The lawyer may rationalize his endeavors to prove that his client's occupation disabled him with a coronarv thrombosis, and therefore that he should be paid, as contributing to the higher good, but the physician should also allow his broader viewpoint to prevail in denying the relationship, in the absence of reasonable evidence, with the hope that the social pattern would thereby be improved by lowering the barriers of the economic fear of employing cardiac subjects.
It does no good for the doctor to consider the lawyer ridieulous or nefarious, nor for the lawyer to think of the doctor in court as unsure, indefinite, or merely an instrument on which to play his tune.
When all is said and done, public opinion and social demands will determine the interpretations of the courts. The medical and legal professions stand as great symbols of free and individnal enterprise. Both bid fair to lose status in a socialist polity but the physician especially is speeding the coming of this state if he fosters the establishment of a legal precedent that work is always an evil and mnust perforce accelerate chronic disease. He should instead stick to his scientific guns and let the evils of poverty, chronic nonoceupational disease, and misfortune be alleviated by other processes than by forcing him to accommodate his medical knowledge to the purposes of the social-service millennium.
Summario in Interlingua
Exemplos ab le sphera del niorbos cardiac es usate pro illustrar le argumento general que le concepto medical de causa como factor etiologic e le concepto legal de causa como factor responsabile non es identic. Le autor deplora le progressive degeneration del testiimionio medical in casos de compensation pro accidentes occupational. Ille analysa le situation in omne sui ramificationes super le base del conviction que le rolo legal del profession medical non pote restablir su digiiitate si le medicos mesme non apprecia le fortias e tendentias extra-medical i.e. social, sociologic, e mesmo socialista que codetermina le functiones del cortes.
